Drones and the UK Strategic Defence Review 2025

written by SALIENT Academic Lead and Deputy Director of TAI Richard Kirkham and SALIENT co-investigator Prof Mike Lewis Professor Mike Lewis, University of Bath

The 2025 Strategic Defence Review[1] (SDR) emphasised the integration of autonomous and semi-autonomous drone systems into the UK’s future force structure. References to “swarms”, “uncrewed targeting networks”, “Digital Targeting Web”, etc. underscored a vision of defence transformation by digital and robotic systems. Despite this ambition there was little detail overall and intriguingly limited reference to current UK UAS capability and projects (e.g., Project Corvus[2], Project Aether[3], ASGARD[4], Anduril’s Altius 600/700[5], etc.).

Unsurprisingly, the strategic rationale for expanded drone investment rested heavily on “lessons” drawn from Ukraine. The implication being that Ukraine, including the recent ‘success’ of Project Spiderweb (https://theconversation.com/ukraine-drone-strikes-on-russian-airbase-reveal-any-country-is-vulnerable-to-the-same-kind-of-attack-258005), has demonstrated the effectiveness and necessity of drone-centric warfare. A more objective evaluation would similarly note the declining impact of larger drones (cf US-Houthi conflict[6]) and, while short-range UASs, including FPV (first-person view) drones have been widely used, they do have (increasing?) susceptibility to battlefield jamming and electronic countermeasures, and very high attrition rates – requiring the mass production of drones.

The SDR only obliquely mentions manufacturing (assembly?) capability, with the announcement of six new munitions and energetics factories. These are vaguely positioned as both replenishing stockpiles of propellants and explosives and supporting “modular” UAS production. Talk of “surge production” and “advanced robotics” may suggest adaptable, high-throughput lines, potentially located at sites like DM Kineton and Shoeburyness. It also suggests that drone systems are being treated as replenishable, battlefield-scale assets.

Absent a clearer, wider industrial strategy for drones, there is a risk that the SDR’s vision remains aspirational rather than operationally coherent. How will production link to the UK’s test and validation network (RAF Spadeadam, ParcAberporth, QinetiQ, etc.)? How will manufacturing capacity be balanced with doctrinal requirements for national sovereignty, autonomy, safety, and accountability? Interestingly, such implementation gaps mirror developments among key allies, where the US Replicator initiative, European drone sovereignty programs, and NATO’s emerging autonomous systems strategy face comparable challenges in translating strategic concepts into concrete operational capabilities.

There was also no discussion of proliferation. Since the UK first deployed armed drones in 2007, the global diffusion of UAS capabilities has accelerated significantly, with both state and non-state actors now deploying armed systems. The SDR does not engage with the wider risks of strategic instability associated with this trend or suggest any UK leadership in international forums on UAS controls? This absence is notable, particularly given the UK’s historical positioning as a proponent of arms control and responsible AI use.

Finally, the SDR makes no reference to wider governance concerns such as transparency and democratic accountability. Parliamentary questions and Freedom of Information requests related to UAS operations have increasingly been refused on national security grounds[7]. If UASs and autonomous systems are to play an expanded role in UK defence, especially homeland defence, then mechanisms for civilian oversight and legal accountability will surely need to evolve accordingly?


[1] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf

[2] https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/army-kicks-off-project-to-replace-watchkeeper-drones

[3] https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/defence/uk-stratospheric-haps-project-enters-next-phase

[4] https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-to-award-7-5m-for-long-range-drone-strike-systems/

[5] https://thedefensepost.com/2025/03/25/uk-anduril-factory/

[6] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2025/04/25/houthi-rebels-have-shot-down-7-us-reaper-drones-in-recent-weeks/

[7] Drone operations are now officially classified under national security exemptions typically reserved for Special Forces. In response to FOI requests from Drone Wars UK (https://dronewars.net), the Ministry of Defence began withholding data on Reaper sorties in early 2023, citing Sections 23 and 24 of the Freedom of Information Act. This reversed over a decade of regular disclosure. The Information Commissioner upheld the MOD’s refusal, effectively placing armed drone deployments beyond the reach of routine public or parliamentary oversight.